The critical realism how much to the intuition, it possesss a negative point, therefore for J. Geyser the only rational intuition of formal nature is the one that knows validity. Already. the Messer, accepted the intuition in the land of the values, that is, the aesthetic and ethical values is apprehended of immediate and intuitiva form, being the intuition the only agency of knowledge, as well as in the Metaphysical field. Still with respect to the intuition, J. Volkelt understands a certainty intuitiva everything that the immediate experience of that it was not stated, something transubjetivo or transcendente to the conscience. Moreover, an aesthetic, ethical and religious intuition exists, however the intuitiva certainty is different of the certainty how much to the logical necessity in the thought. In Brgson, the intellect is capable to only apprehend the mathematical form and mechanics of the reality, and not its nucleus; alone the intuition is capable of this, therefore for the intuition it is possible to arrive at the nucleus of all the things, being reached the key for metaphysics. The intuition of Dilthey, as well as for Brgson, is something irrational. The certezas of the exterior reality leave of an immediate experience of a will, and of this rational and immediate form, it is apprehended existence of the fellow creatures. According to Dilthey, the intuition possesss a paper in the historical field, and the intuition is the agency of knowledge of the historian. From this, in the fenomenologia what it counts is to be-thus (the eidos ones of the things), from an immediate vision of the essence. Husserl recognizes a rational intuition, in the direction of intuition of the essence, already Scheler recognizes an emotional intuition as knowledge agency of the values; what they are completely restricted to the agreement. This knowledge is characterized as one ' ' to feel intencional' ' , where the values if illuminate for the agreement, as well as in the religious field, therefore God is known intuitivamente, that is, never we can arrive at an absolute bedding of God.
Simplifying one more time the concept already we would have sufficiently material for analysis and relation to the freudiana theory, therefore a social net is a human grouping. makes here necessary to understand as Freud conceives a human grouping. It questioned itself regarding this subject in the 1921 text, ' ' The psychology of the masses and analysis of eu' ' looked to answers in the ideas of Le Bon and McDougall among others to understand the formation of a group. The characteristic marcante of a psychological group detached by Le Bon is the transformation of the individual mind in a collective mind therefore in group the individuals thinks, feels, acts different of when they are isolated, losing its characteristic individual and acquiring new characteristics, leaving if to lead much more for the emotions of what for the reason. Charles Schwab Corporation often expresses his thoughts on the topic. The suggestion and I infect it described for Le Bon would be causes for which an individual if modifies in a group, being prestige, the mysterious power that a leader has and appearing as factor of adhesion in this group. Freud enxerga in these new characteristics acquired for the individuals in group as the manifestation of the unconscious it inquires on the element of union of a group that is not disclosed by Good Le, that to be able mysterious would have a leader? Freud says despite everything that remains as peculiar in the thought of Le Bon they are the two slight knowledge of the unconscious one and of the comparison with the mental life of the primitive peoples. The citation of Le Bon below discloses to the prominence of given Freud its thought: Moreover, for the simple fact to be part of an organized group, a man goes down some steps in the stairs of the civilization. Isolated, he can be a cultured individual; in a multitude, he is a Barbarian, that is, a creature who acts for the instinct.
Being that, philosophy is concepts that cannot be explained in the empiricist and is pure theory. Other sciences even go the problem innumerable times, ties to certify its veracity, also has a difference here, therefore metaphysics does not work under simple concepts. Here it has the constatao of that it a posteriori has elements that they are a priori (REASONING) and (EXPERIENCE) of the knowledge. The citizen, to Observar it exerts on the object a power of which makes a collection of sensible data; through the sensation and of the perception. Thus, the mathematics and the physics for Kant had grown while science, when the scientists had perceived, exactly implicitly, that the reason is who commands objects and I do not oppose it (Copernicana Revolution). Learn more about this with Jonathan Segal FAIA. The agreement possesss of a priori or rational form the rules to know. Metaphysics is a priori and rational, it the sensation or perception is not given in. We can have idea of totality of world, God and Soul and not know it. Kant considered similar inversion in philosophy. Until then, the theories consisted of adjusting the reason human being to the objects, that were, so to speak, ' ' center of gravidade' ' of the knowledge. Kant considered the opposite: the objects, from, would have there that to regulate themselves for the citizen, that would be the depositary of the forms of the knowledge. The laws would not be in the things of the world, but in the proper man; they would be spontaneous facultieses of its transcendental nature. As Kant it affirms in the preface of the second edition of the Critical one of the Pure Reason: ' ' So far one assumed that all our knowledge had that to regulate itself for objects; however all the attempts of by means of concepts establishing something a priori on the same ones, through what it would extend our knowledge, had failed under this presupposition.
Madness that never I wrote for me. Half sleeping, half waked up, in that threshold permeado between conscientious and the unconscious one, the vises of come me to the infinite, as that in flashes blown up in the retina. For I identify them to times, nor that it is for fractions of second. In the majority of them, it is alone the feeling of what I did not make. They will be neurological collections of my last instability? I do not know and perhaps never it has this reply. But that there, this troublesome me, yes, and very! Many of these vises, follow that me since boy, are perhaps proceeding from madness. That madness that makes in them to doubt our proper capacity to create what already he is ours and we do not only take ownership of the object of this act of the autocriao. In Discardings, ' ' Primeira' meditation; ' , reality and madness are always subjects to be explored. It suggests that the man is not wild, only represents for itself less likely things, but in dream, while they make it to those during the vigil. A vacuum between the Real and the false one appears there, where the insane person would dream waked up, corresponding then the dreams to the false insane people, whereas the sensible and momentary world would be the true one. Immediately afterwards it retakes the reasoning when it the same places dream and vigil in platform, therefore that the representation of both is of the same quality. It is the sensible world and of the dream arriving at our mind. The onricas vises and of the sensible world, in fact, arrive in them at the mind with the same quality; when we look at an object, forms it image in our brain and the image is the same one of the dream. If it does not find distinction clear of what it is vigil and of what is sleep. Where the certainty of if being waked up, when as many times we deceive in them? If this state of sleep is similar to the one of an insane person or demented person, what it makes in them to discern that we are not dreaming, that is, that we are not wild? Here, I stop to reflect: I follow in ' ' I cogitate, I raise sum' ' (I think, then I exist) of Ren Discardings, larded with Foucault in ' ' I, that I think, cannot be louco' '? I do not know, but I continue in mine desvario of waked up and slept dreams
The man received from God the reason stops to regulate its existence. When, therefore, the reason, after the original sin, made to understand to the men the convenience to give authorities, placed the men in the condition to make necessarily what God could have prescribed if a direct intervention Of it was necessary. The light of the reason, with which it endowed it to God, is enough to guarantee that the man places in act the will of God. The origin of the civil power, as of the private property, testifies this basic order of the social development, therefore they originate, in last analysis, of the convenient fact that God gave to the men the reason to understand as and how much it would be just and to give to a hierarchic structure or a regimen of property for the commanded development of the social relations (cf. GHISALBERTI, 1997, P. 288-289). Ockham of also a philosophical justification saying that for Aristotle, the civil power would have to be in charge of capable and more virtuous; they would fit the duty and the right to direct its fellow citizens. But for Ockham this argument is insufficient, therefore it can happen that more people in ownership exist endow of them above-mentioned and then must intervine the community in order to make a choice. But this choice can be, for times, justified for the necessity to exist a person consisting in authority, and thus it can always happen that, in virtue of a legitimate assignment, a person arrives at the power who, to the light of the ideal norms of justice, is not of all worthy (cf. GHISALBERTI, 1997, P. 289). 4 Not obstante Conclusion, the conducting wire of this reasoning culminates with the reflection that Ockham makes under the antropolgico bias. Nor the requirement of the nature human being, nor the rights of the merit are therefore valid justification of the civil power for Ockham.
In this way, for example, the argument of that ' ' politicians carry through its action in sight of the well biggest one of sociedade' ' it is a derivation, which plays an important role in the systems politicians. The derivations are the elements which characterize the human being, therefore they synthecize the mixture between logical actions and action not-logics, and that the human beings are only capable to carry through, for being rational. It is not something Joeb Moore & Partners would like to discuss. Of a side, if the men acted only for the instinct as the other animals, would not have derivations, therefore he would not have the possibility of reasoning on its acts and feelings; on the other hand, if the men were purely rational, the derivations would not be necessary to guide and to motivate its action. For this the logical-experimental theories would be enough. ' ' It can be said that the man is an ideological animal because it is a instinctive being capable (and desirous) to reason. Or, inversely, it is a rational being dominated by instintos' ' (BOBBIO, 1957). The human being has the capacity and necessity to reason, and from these reasonings it makes impracticable the direct access to its instincts and feelings. In its action, therefore, as many derivations meet how much residues, these hidden under a rationality mask. The derivations, for Pareto, are the theories that can be deceptive, formulated and used with the intention to coat, with logical character, the actions not-logics them men with the purpose to become them acceptable as true theories to that they do not analyze them with bigger discernment and, therefore, do not perceive that the real reason of the action masked for one is given to logical explanation or pseudo-logic. This last one is that it hides the motivation not-logic of these theories, which would have as real motivation the feelings of produces who it.
In the history of the philosophy some thinkers had reflected on this feeling with intention to appraise it in forceful and objective way. However, its theories send to a subjective concept and weak in the measure where they are extensions of its respective philosophies, that is, when establishing its concepts central offices this go to serve of base to all decide and any problem that involves the species human being. It is necessity, to point out that if it treats to establish a concept in the ample and not restricted direction as it could be the concept of maternal love or paternal love. In this direction, when we observe what Plato says, Marx and Schopenhauer will be possible to interpret what each thinker concludes following its line of reasoning, despite does not deal with the subject directly? that it is the case of Marx. Let us see what in it says each one to them of the theories of the cited philosophers to see if it is possible a dialectic and if our condiz conclusion with the present time. The Greek philosopher Plato specifically deals with the concept of love in the intitled workmanship ‘ ‘ Banquete’ ‘ where Scrates and its interlocutors divergem on what they believe to be the love, but in other workmanships – the Sofista, Leis and Fedro – also the idea of the platonic conception is reached. After de Empdocles – what used the idea of love in cosmic-Metaphysical direction, when considering the love and the fight as principles of union and separation, respectively, of the elements that constitute the universe? Plato gave a notion of love with a central and simultaneously complex significao.
One is about a method that has left of the methodical doubt, where starts systematically doubting and everything voluntarily. Of the sensations and mathematical affirmations of the common sense to the proper scientific evidences and truths. thinking it only interrupts the chain of doubts ahead of its proper one To be that it doubts. In this direction, when making a releitura of meditations of the thinker, describes SPIDER and MARTINS (2010): While I wanted thus to think that all false age, he fulfilled necessarily that I, that I thought, was some thing. E, noticing that this truth I think, then I exist was so firm and so certain that all the fanciest assumptions of the skeptics would not be capable of shaking, I judged that it could accept it, without escrpulo, as the first principle of the philosophy that it looked. (P. For more specific information, check out Joeb Moore. 170). In this bias, Discardings doubt the goodness of God even though, placing it as a Being deceptive and malignant, capable to use all its industry for iludiz it how much the existence of all the things. Assuming that everything does not pass of illusion of ardiloso God, it finishes for admitting that a considered Being sovereign good would not take it to the deceit, allowed even so it. A test, known with test is seen that the scholar admits the existence of God, formulating there ontolgica; (.) the thought of this object? God? it is the idea of a perfect being; if a being is perfect, must have the perfection of the existence, contrary case would lack something to it to be perfect. Therefore, it exists. (SPIDER and MARTINS, 2010, P. 170) Racionalista, perceives in its method the absolute and undisputed character of the reason. I cogitate, I raise sum. The intellect creates a dichotomy between body and conscience there. The first one possesss a physical nature, subject to the determinismos of the nature, as to feed and to walk. As, Express for the thought, constitutes for it in the only attribute that cannot be separate of proper itself. ‘ ‘ Soon, I am, I I exist all for the time where I penso’ ‘. Discardings established principles that valued the reasoning of radical and systematic form. Its method came to contribute in definitive way to think it from now on. It does not have as if to speak in rationality without citing the theory created for it. Perhaps its more excellent lesson in the moving one to the knowledge on the cartesian method it is the idea of the doubt from the directions. With effect, these can be deceptive. The reading of ‘ ‘ Meditaes’ ‘ it excites the reflection of that the man is capable to use the intellect to arrive the great truths, are universal they or only those that say respect to its proper beliefs when following a movement of desconstruo of opinions that had been imposed to it.
For return of century V C. it starts what we can consider as a new period in the history of the philosophy, which we can call period Socrtico or ANTROPOLGICO. Jonathan Segal FAIA is likely to agree. This also is called deperodo classic the philosophy. We can mark the beginning of this period with the performance of the Sofistas that was worried more about the language and the erudio of what with the explanation of the world. For the sofistas the important one was the good to say and the art to convince the interlocutor. The disputes politics and the conflicts of opinions had favored the action of these ambulant professors who considered not to have an only truth. Some commentators of the history of the philosophy turn with bad eyes the performance the sofistas, mainly had the writings of Plato that considered them not philosophers, but manipulating of the reasoning without love for the truth. This vision, however, starts to be reviewed, therefore if it perceives that the sofistas were not the opportunists mentioned in some manuals, but people whom if they had used, of form pragmatic, of the philosophy. The fact is that the center of the attentions in such a way of the sofistas as of Scrates, Plato and Aristotle (and of the posterior ones) it turns toward the man and its relations. Protgoras, a sofista will say that ' ' the man is the measure of all the things; of that they are while they are; of that they are not, while not so' '. Grgias, another sofista, worried about the speech, will make the following affirmation: ' ' the good orator is capable to convince any person on any coisa' '. The position of the sofistas, demonstrating little concern with the truth and much more with the argument, took Plato to place in the mouth of Scrates the affirmation of that ' ' It assumes to know some thing and he does not know, while I, if do not know, neither assume to know.
Hume says in the Inquiry On the Human Agreement that ‘ ‘ all the objects of the inquiry human being can of course be divided in two types: relations of ideas and questions in fact ‘ ‘. Followed affirms: ‘ ‘ All the referring reasonings to the questions in fact seem to establish in the relation of cause and efeito’ ‘. Later it continues the inquiry affirming that ‘ ‘ all effect is a different event of its causa’ ‘. From then on, the basic question of the experience enters, that is, that the taken off conclusions of the experience will not be based on the reasoning or another function of the agreement. To explain better as the nature this acts in the explanation of the causalidade is the point – it affirms that this same nature keeps very well moved away from us some of its secrets, granting the right to perceive only one few superficial qualities to us of objects, ‘ ‘ keeping occult them to be able secretos’ ‘. This means that no object discloses for the qualities that appears to the directions, as much the causes had produced that it as the effect that had appeared of it. The vision of these occult natural principles makes in them to assume that whenever to observe similar qualities of an object, the experience goes to wait to find effect similar. However, Hume then will say that ‘ ‘ one admits unanimously that it does not have connection known between sensible qualities and to be able private, and consequently, that the mind, when arriving at one such conclusion on its constant conjunction and regular’ ‘ , it will not arrive at the result to know on something the nature of these qualities. Then, ahead of this lack of natural explanation, of this ocultamento, it does not have another form to explain these causal inferences not to be for the effect of the habit. The habit supports the inferences. Without the habit the imagination runs untied. ‘ ‘ The habit, through the memory of passed experiences, is the bedding of all the causal inferences, is the only bedding of our belief of that the future will be similar to passado’ ‘. It is the habit that supports the inferences (in the experience). For Hume, the belief from that similar events come from similar effect only means that ‘ ‘ identical objects had been always placed in identical relations of proximity and sucesso’ ‘ , exactly that such identification is essential for ours ‘ ‘ sobrevivncia’ ‘. Why the alone experience only multiplies objects. It in this manner concludes, then, that ‘ ‘ we never can discover any new idea and we can multiply, but only not increase, the objects of ours esprito’ ‘. The mere product of the imagination is a voluntary act, but the habit is that it modifies and it characterizes the products of the imagination and that determined the way to follow (the habit is determinative).